Blogging the San Diego Padres… established 1997

I haven’t written much about the WBC, mainly because it always seemed so far away. But the tournament kicks off tonight in Tokyo with Korea vs Chinese Taipei (aka Taiwan or Republic of China). Also, my tickets for the semifinals and finals at Petco arrived yesterday, so that’s gotten me a little fired up about the whole thing.

I know some folks question the timing of the tournament, or the unusual eligibility rules (if you had a parent who was born there, you’re in), but I’m just psyched to see baseball in a big-league park in March, hopefully watching some players I wouldn’t otherwise have a chance to see. It’ll be like when the extremely short-lived Aztec Invitational christened Petco Park a couple years ago. You may recall that SDSU’s Rielly Embrey hit the first home run in park history during that tournament. Embrey is currently in the Padres organization, but who can say if he’ll ever get the opportunity to hit another homer at Petco Park. Don’t get me wrong, I’m happy to see the name players out there representing their (or someone else’s) country, but I want to see some guy I’ve never even heard of have his moment in the proverbial sun.

Anyway.

Over at Fire Brand of the American League, Andrew Lipsett handicaps the WBC. Baseball America also is covering the event, and of course, you can find out all kinds of stuff at the official site. There are even a couple of blogs that are updated with considerable irregularity.

If anyone knows of other coverage of the event, please drop a note in the comments. I’m particularly interested in anything looking at the WBC from a non-North American perspective. What are the Japanese saying about it? The Dutch? The Australians?

Man, I love this time of year.

Channel 4 rebroadcast the 2005 game of the year last night. The grand slam by Khalil Greene with two out in the ninth to tie it was unbelieveable. Equally unlikely were the events leading up to Greene’s heroics, propelled at least in part by Frank Robinson’s curious use of his bullpen.

This got me to thinking about the Padres’ bullpen (my mind works in ways I prefer not to ponder). With the lineup settled except for the battle of second base, and the rotation pretty well set in stone, one of the few areas of intrigue in this year’s camp (aside from who is actually on the team, of course) is the relief corps.

Last spring the Padres had Trevor Hoffman, Akinori Otsuka, and Scott Linebrink, followed by a bunch of question marks. Chris Hammond, Dennys Reyes, and Rudy Seanez ended up filling out the back end, with Clay Hensley picking up for Reyes after the latter had worn out his welcome.

This year, Otsuka is gone, with Hensley joining Hoffman and Linebrink as the only “certainties” (in quotes because relievers are such a volatile bunch) in the 2006 bullpen. That leaves eight guys fighting for the final three spots. In alphabetical order, they are:

Jason Anderson
Pros: Very effective at Triple-A each of the past two seasons, with excellent peripherals.
Cons: Wild, susceptible to longball in brief stints with Yankees, Mets, and Indians over parts of 2003-2005.
Bottom line: Insurance policy at Portland; ready to step in if needed.

Steve Andrade
Pros: Dominant minor-league numbers over four full seasons (2.20 ERA, 5.81 H/9, 13.34 K/9 in 172 IP); better version of Anderson.
Cons: Very little experience (13.2 IP) above Double-A; Rule V draftee must be offered back to Toronto if he doesn’t make team.
Bottom line: A key part of the Sean Burroughs/Dewon Brazelton deal; appears to be one of the front-runners.

Dewon Brazelton
Pros: Former first-round pick; great collegiate pitcher.
Cons: No consistent success at any professional level; no appreciable experience working out of bullpen.
Bottom line: Maybe Darren Balsley can help him unlock potential; then again, maybe not.

Doug Brocail
Pros: Best track record of any candidate; 4.06 career ERA over 688.2 IP.
Cons: ERA over 5.50 in 2005; turns 39 in May.
Bottom line: Has experience, pitched for the Padres before, will get a job.

Scott Cassidy
Pros: Strong 2005 at Triple-A.
Cons: One extended stint in bigs didn’t go so well (5.73 ERA in 58 games with Toronto in 2002).
Bottom line: Older version of Anderson; longshot to make team.

Alan Embree

Pros: Over 600 big-league appearances; pitched for Bruce Bochy’s Padres in 2002.
Cons: 7.62 ERA in 67 games in 2005.
Bottom line: He’s the man if healthy and Bochy decides he needs a lefty.

Seth Etherton
Pros: Former first-round pick; plenty of experience in upper minors.
Cons: Poor results in three different trips to the Show (2000 Angels, 2003 Reds, 2005 Athletics); spotty health record.
Bottom line: Intriguing use of a Rule V pick; limited upside means he may stick with organization even if he doesn’t break camp with the big club — more potential insurance at Portland.

Brian Sikorski
Pros: Dominant numbers in Japan as reliever 2002-2005; scouting reports may be limited — advantage, pitcher.
Cons: Hasn’t faced a hitter in the big leagues since 2000; unknown quantity.
Bottom line: Padres didn’t bring him back to North America for giggles; he’ll be there.

With the exception of Brocail and Embree, I haven’t seen any of these guys pitch and can’t comment on their stuff. My impressions are based on stats and intuition.

If I were a betting man, I’d go with Andrade, Brocail, and Sikorski. I could see Embree sticking with the club if Bochy decides he needs a lefty. And if I had to guess which of these guys might come out of nowhere a la Hensley last year, it’d probably be Etherton.

As you’ve no doubt heard by now, former Padres right-hander Brian Lawrence is expected to miss the season following labrum and rotator cuff surgery. It’s interesting to note that the Nationals didn’t give Lawrence an MRI before making the trade that brought him to Washington. But GM Jim Bowden’s explanation makes sense:

It’s expensive to do MRIs on every single transaction. In the case of Brian, he had made every single start the last four or five years. We saw him throw a three-hit shutout [in his final start of 2005]. We were trading a player [Castilla] with a bad knee. We felt that there was MRI risk on both sides if the deal was made, and we made a decision not to.

Seriously, who was the greater injury risk in this trade? Of course, the answer is Castilla and it isn’t even close. Since the start of the 2002 campaign, Lawrence’s first full season, only nine pitchers have made more starts in the big-leagues. As much as any pitcher ever can be, the guy was a lock for 30+ starts.

Or so it seemed.

The take-home lessons here aren’t anything new but they bear repeating:

• Past durability in a pitcher is not necessarily an indicator of continued future durability.
• Regardless of how hard he throws (Lawrence routinely has one of the slowest fastballs in the game), a pitcher places tremendous strain on his arm and body just by the simple act of doing his job.

Bad blow for the Nats. Worse blow for Lawrence. Here’s hoping he’s back out on the mound real soon.

Last week in the discussion we were trying to figure out who would and/or should bat second for the Padres in 2006. Reader Steve pointed us to a projected batting order at Padres.com, which shows Mike Cameron in the #2 hole.

A debate then ensued over whether Cameron strikes out too much to bat so high in the order. Lance Richardson eschewed the notion, claiming that “the worst thing a #2 hitter can do is ground into a double play.” Readers Anthony and Pat suggested some criteria for a #2 hitter, most notably the ability to get on base. Seems reasonable.

My own personal opinion is that everyone not named Brian Giles is best suited to hitting #6. Unfortunately this isn’t a viable option, so I looked around to see what others who had studied such matters might have to say.

First stop was Dan Agonistes, who notes that lineup construction is “one of those things that your intuition tells you must be one way when hard data shows something else.” Beyond stating the conundrum quite eloquently, he also points to a thorough evaluation of lineups (potential number overload warning) done by Tom Ruane at Retrosheet.

Ruane presents a great deal of data showing various scenarios and then concludes that, “If anything, my approach shows that batting orders matter even less than people have believed.” From this follows the assertion that, “Since all but the most pathologically weird lineups produce just about the same number of runs, I might be inclined to select the lineup that makes the most intuitive sense to the players and fans. Simply put, it’s not worth all the fuss you’d cause trying to be clever with lineups.”

Heady stuff. Potentially useful, but not terribly satisfying. Sure seems like lineup construction should matter, doesn’t it?

Well, let’s assume it does. Now what?

A funny thing happened over the weekend. I discovered this cool lineup analysis tool over at Baseball Musings.

I couldn’t resist. I grabbed my copy of Ron Shandler’s Baseball Forecaster and plugged his projections for the Padres starting eight (assuming Mark Bellhorn at second base) into the tool. I used actual 2005 figures (.180 OBP/.190 SLG) for the pitcher’s spot.

According to the numbers I fed into the tool, the Padres’ optimal lineup is as follows (please be seated for this part):

1. Brian Giles, rf
2. Mike Piazza, c
3. Mark Bellhorn, 2b
4. Mike Cameron, cf
5. Ryan Klesko, 1b
6. Khalil Greene, ss
7. Vinny Castilla, 3b
8. pitcher
9. Dave Roberts, lf

Aside from the ghastly notion of batting Bellhorn third and the unconventional employment of the pitcher’s spot at #8, I’m struck by the idea of Piazza in the #2 hole. Although he gets on base at a decent clip (or did prior to 2005), Piazza also is one of the slowest players in all of baseball and a perpetual threat to ground into a double play.

Here is what the Padres.com article referenced earlier projects:

1. Dave Roberts, lf
2. Mike Cameron, cf
3. Brian Giles, rf
4. Mike Piazza, c
5. Ryan Klesko, 1b
6. Khalil Greene, ss
7. Vinny Castilla, 3b
8. Mark Bellhorn, 2b
9. pitcher

The Baseball Musings Lineup Analysis tool shows the above lineup scoring 4.777 runs per game, which comes out to 774 runs for the season. Using the optimal configuration, the Padres score 4.997 runs per game, or 810 for the season. In other words, tweaking the lineup in a way that will make sense to no-one should net the Pads an additional 36 runs over the course of 162 games. In a tightly contested division, that could be the difference between making the playoffs and going home early.

It’s worth noting here that we’re still talking theory. Even if it made sense, nobody would use the “optimized” lineup because it looks so damn weird and is the kind of thing that could get a guy fired, or worse. That said, it’s fascinating stuff, and Dan Scotto has given some guidelines for characteristics of each spot in the lineup over at Beyond the Boxscore. Here is what Scotto says about the #2 hole:

The 2-hitter should be the lineup’s most balanced hitter, a good combination of OBP and SLG. David Wright fits the bill here, as does the player I chose, Chase Utley. The first guy I thought of was Mike Lowell in his prime, when I looked at the results and coefficients.

On the Padres, is that really Piazza? I’m not so sure. A better choice might be Klesko. If there is one skill of his that hasn’t deteriorated due to age and injury, it’s the ability to reach base.

Klesko also doesn’t ground into many double plays — just 14 in 1000 plate appearances over the past two seasons. The only guys in the projected lineup to get doubled up at a lower rate during that time are Bellhorn and, you guessed it, Cameron.

Again, I don’t see any real solid candidates for the #2 hole on this team. Klesko is probably my favorite option. But if you’ve already got lefties leading off and batting third, then it makes some sense to break that up with a right-handed hitter. And on a team devoid of traditional #2 type hitters, Cameron seems as good a choice as any to me.

Then again, maybe it doesn’t matter.

Tunes: Pinback, Jason Falkner, The Chills, Loretta Lynn, Rush, Keali’i Reichel, Thingy, Modest Mouse, XTC, This Mortal Coil, Elliott Smith, Dead Can Dance, Live.

With the Mike Piazza signing sparing us the indignity of a David Ross/Doug Mirabelli showdown behind the plate, the only real battle this spring is at second base. Incumbent Mark Loretta is gone, leaving veteran Mark Bellhorn and prospect Josh Barfield to compete for the job.

Many people would like to see Barfield get the nod when the Padres break camp. Given manager Bruce Bochy’s aversion to young, unproven hitters, this might not be realistic. On the other hand, Khalil Greene was able to force Bochy’s hand two springs ago, so maybe there’s hope.

Today’s question is, What are the potential benefits and drawbacks of either scenario?

On the Barfield side of the equation, we have good hitting ability with some power and questionable plate discipline. Think along the lines of Orlando Hudson. We also have a defensive reputation that has been less than glowing in the past, but which seems not to be a concern at the moment. And, of course, we have youthful exuberance.

In Bellhorn, we have extreme inability to make contact (he’s struck out in 28.7% of career plate appearances — a higher frequency than Adam Dunn, Jose Hernandez, and Dave Kingman, among others). We also have brief but explosive displays of power (27 homers with the Cubs in 2002, 17 with the Red Sox in 2004). And we have veteran leadership, of which there is no shortage on this year’s team.

So. What’s on second?

In a recent North County Times article about new rotation member Chris Young, Padres skipper Bruce Bochy is quoted as saying, “History has shown that the taller pitchers take longer to develop.” Intuitively this makes sense. You’re dealing with more moving parts and a higher center of gravity. From a mechanical standpoint, a lot can go wrong.

But is it true? Do tall pitchers take longer to develop? Or, since this sets up a comparison I don’t have time to examine, do tall pitchers take a long time to develop?

Since 1986, 21 pitchers who stand 6’6″ or taller have registered their first 100+ IP season and have gone on to post at least three such seasons in the big leagues (I realize this is somewhat self-selecting, as it weeds out the guys who didn’t have any kind of staying power, but do you really want to read about the likes of Dave Otto, Jim Pittsley, and Tim Pugh?). Of those 21, all but three (Jeff D’Amico, Roy Halladay, Blake Stein) followed that first 100+ IP season with another. Here are the ERA+ of those 18 in Year 1 and Year 2:

Among the 18 pitchers listed here, 11 had an ERA better than league average in their first season working 100 or more innings. Ten of these guys did better in their second full season than their first, with seven regressing and one (Sabathia) serving up a repeat performance.

I don’t know that I’d want to draw any solid conclusions from this, but it’s interesting that so many of the tall pitchers we’ve looked at actually came out of the gate pretty strong. Not what I would have expected to find.

Perhaps more disconcerting is that over a quarter of these guys (Carpenter, Cooke, Elarton, Magrane, and McDonald) suffered devastating injuries in their mid- to late-20s. I have no idea how this stacks up against the general pitching population or whether there is any correlation between height and propensity for injury, but it’s at least worth noting.

Looking again at the pitchers above, the obvious comparison is between Young and Randy Johnson because both are so tall. However, Johnson didn’t have anywhere near the kind of command at the same age as Young has now and, as the article notes, their pitching styles are very different. From a statistical standpoint, the better comps are Benes and Carpenter:

Even these aren’t perfect. Young’s command is much better than either of the other two. This isn’t surprising since he is older and should be more polished than they were at the same stage. He also probably won’t have their upside.

Returning to our original question, there isn’t real solid evidence that taller pitchers take a long time to develop. It may well be that this once was true, but over the past 20 years the numbers don’t support the theory. Of the 18 pitchers we examined, 61% had an ERA better than league average in their first season working 100+ innings. And 56% of these pitchers improved in their second season. How these numbers stack up against shorter pitchers during the same period remains an open question.

As anyone who has been paying attention is well aware, the Padres have made wholesale roster changes this winter. The question among many of the Friar faithful is, “To what effect?”

Shaun O’Neill at the North County Times attempts to put some of the pieces together. He suggests that CEO Sandy Alderson and company have a strategy that transcends the product we will see on the field in 2006.

O’Neill, citing the Padres’ awareness of their status as division champion by default, asserts that “change needed to be made, even if plugging one hole opened another.” Change for the sake of change isn’t always the best strategy, but there is a lot to be said for eschewing complacency in an organization that has been decidedly mediocre for much of its existence. As Rich Campbell at San Diego Spotlight notes, “A decade ago or three, we would have been told we had to sit through a 100 loss season for the ‘good of the franchise’.”

One thing is clear under Alderson’s regime: These are not your padres’ Padres.

O’Neill continues by pointing to the addition of veterans Vinny Castilla and Mike Piazza as recognition that the club cannot undergo a complete rebuilding project due to its promise to fans to remain competitive on moving into Petco Park. He identifies these two players as “short-term solutions” for an organization that “isn’t yet cranking out major-league-ready players with any consistency” (2005 first-rounder Cesar Carrillo may help change that real soon).

Although this latter realization might not be the most comforting thing to hear, it beats hearing that the folks in charge think the farm system is in great shape and doesn’t need improvement. The Padres front office appears to have gone through a pretty thorough and honest self-assessment in determining where the club is now and what steps it needs to take to get where it wants to go.

In other words, there is a plan.

More clues as to what that plan entails? Try this on for size:

It’s telling that the Padres traded several homegrown players… Alderson and the Padres will demand more than producing players; they want to develop impact players.

Proof is in the pudding, of course, but it’s encouraging to know that the current regime doesn’t appear to have much use for mediocrity. O’Neill also notes that the Padres are in the process of “rewriting their organizational manual” and mentions the club’s increased commitment to finding and developing talent in the Dominican Republic.

The Padres have posted back-to-back winning seasons for the first time since 1991-1992, and yet nobody is satisified. The stakes have been raised. Although the specific moves made this winter may not be enough to keep the Padres on top in the NL West, they do demonstrate a rejection of complacency in the face of moderate success.

In other words, good is no longer good enough.

The team remains hamstrung by some terrible contracts, but those all come off the books after 2006. Next winter, the Padres will be in position to spend money on free agents (not carelessly; unlike some organizations with deeper pockets, they still cannot afford to make stupid mistakes). And, of course, they’ll have had another draft under Grady Fuson.

Is any of this a guarantee for future success? Absolutely not. But it’s a strategy that at least has a chance. And once you give yourself a chance, anything can happen.

I hate to give you just links with no commentary, but that’s all I have time for today. Enjoy!

• Scouting the Division: San Diego (Bad Altitude). I find the idea of a Rockies blogger talking smack about the Padres after their respective 2005 seasons somewhat amusing.
• Piazza signing motivates TC’s Mirabelli (Traverse City Record Eagle)
• Scouting Padres Prospect: Jon Knott (Scout.com)
• USD’s rise, rankings polls apart (U-T). In the wake of their three-game sweep of defending national champion Texas at home and two victories at UC Davis, the Toreros find themselves in uncharted territory, so to speak.
• Burroughs still a confident kid (Long Beach Press-Telegram)
• Tucker headed to White Sox (Sapulpa Daily Herald). Sapulpa, Oklahoma? Really. Anyway, former Padres farmhand Rusty Tucker has signed on with the World Series champs. Here’s hoping the hard-throwing left-hander can regain his command and have a big-league career.
• Lima, Mets agree to minor-league contract (ESPN). Remember that nasty little rumor from a few weeks ago that Lima was coming to San Diego? We can all breathe a sigh of relief.
• Three-and-Oh (Hardball Times). John Walsh takes a very thorough look at how hitters have fared on a 3-0 count over the years. Tip o’ the cap to Ducksnorts reader Didi for finding this one.

Tunes: Incubus, Cheb Mami, Underdog Project, Nick Drake, Heavy Vegetable, They Might Be Giants, Frank Black

“A player’s true level of ability remains unknown and unknowable so long as he is not given the opportunity to prove it.”

Obvious, perhaps, but important. Without proof we are reduced to religious arguments: Belief based on MLEs, scouting reports, or other factors. Non-believers cite lack of indisputable evidence: “Yes, but MLEs are just equivalencies — they don’t substitute for actual big-league production” or “I’ll grant you that he’s got five tools but what good are they if he can’t lay off breaking balls in the dirt?”

Even the language takes on religious overtones. A player gains a cult following. People demand that he be set free. We saw this in San Diego in 2005 with Xavier Nady. Many fans (myself included) were vocal in their desire to see Nady get a chance to play and show what he could do. Others were equally vocal in their doubts about his ability. Both sides had justifiable reasons for their belief, but nobody could prove anything. We still can’t.

Years ago, Ruben Rivera was given ample opportunity to prove himself at the big-league level, and despite an overwhelming abundance of tools, the only thing Rivera succeeded in proving is that, without a doubt, he is not a big-league ballplayer. He had the chance to demonstrate his true level of ability, and that is precisely what he did.

On the flip side, Jake Peavy took the same exact opportunity and proved himself to be one of the elite pitchers in the game. As with Rivera, there was a good deal of evidence in the minor-league numbers and scouting reports to suggest that success would be a likely outcome. The difference, of course, is that Peavy delivered on his promise.

What Rivera and Peavy share in common, however, is that they were given the opportunity to prove — one way or another — their true level of ability. This is very different from the case of Nady or that of former Padres first baseman Roberto Petagine, in whose honor I have named this principle.

Petagine, you will recall, compiled monstrous numbers at the minor-league level and gained a cult following of believers who insisted (without actually knowing) that he would outperform the likes of, say, J.T. Snow if given the opportunity. Petagine never got that chance but continued to dominate the minor leagues before embarking on a successful career in Japan, which only served to fuel the fire of his believers.

On the other hand, there were those who insisted that Petagine was nothing more than a “Quadruple-A” caliber player: too good for the minors, not good enough for the big leagues. But again, due to his lack of opportunity, these folks were expressing belief based on a combination of what they knew and what they thought they knew.

The truth, as often is the case, lay not at either end of the spectrum but rather toward the middle. What we knew with certainty about Petagine is that he had absolutely mastered the minor leagues and that he hadn’t done much at the big-league level in samples too small to carry much meaning.

Both sides could cite evidence to support their belief of Petagine’s true level of ability, but without his being given the opportunity to demonstrate his capablilities in the only forum that mattered (i.e., the Show), nobody could prove anything.

And thus any discussion of Petagine’s ability neccessarily becomes a religious debate — a question of faith, of belief. By extension, so do discussions of other players who fit the same profile — big minor-league numbers, insufficient big-league opportunity. Which leads us back to this:

“A player’s true level of ability remains unknown and unknowable so long as he is not given the opportunity to prove it.”

Something to contemplate the next time you’re sitting around with strangers, listening to Pink Floyd at 3 in the morning. Or who knows, maybe it will be Steely Dan.