First off, big thanks to Dave Roberts for providing a spark at the top of the Padres lineup the past two years. As everyone around here knows, I hated the trade that brought him here when it happened, but he turned out to be way better than I (or anyone) could’ve expected. I was very wrong about Roberts, and I couldn’t be happier to have been wrong.
That said, big thanks to the Giants for giving Roberts $18 million for 3 years to play center field. As those of us who watched him attempt to patrol center in 2005 know, Roberts is overmatched at the position. He also turns 35 at the end of May.
I was happy enough when the Dodgers overpaid for Juan Pierre, but to have the Giants overpay for Roberts? Again, acknowledging all that he brought to the club during his time in San Diego, I couldn’t be happier. Plus Roberts is a Type A free agent who was offered arbitration, which means two more draft picks are coming to the Padres to go with the two resulting from Woody Williams’ signing with the Astros.
I cannot stress enough the positive contributions that Roberts made as a member of the Padres. He genuinely was fun to watch and I love the way he plays the game. I’m happy that Roberts was able to cash in on his success here, that the Padres didn’t commit crazy money to him, and that the Giants did.
I’d say the weekend is off to a good start. 
50 – no, no, no…clearly none of those apply either!
43: I’m rereading “Moneyball,” so I know of one place where you might have picked up the “devaluing defense” thing, but who are the ones creating tools to better measure defensive performance? Why bother if it’s not that big of deal? That generalization doesn’t seem defensible any more considering all the different metrics out there.
52: An interesting note is that the A’s were one of the best defensive teams in baseball the last year or two and that was obviously by design.
re 49
I assume your read 26, 28 and 30. Those are just a few quick quotes I found on “situational hitting” from Chris Chambliss, Willie Randolph and Harold Reynolds.
Just so you aren’t so terribly perplexed by my assertion — as your “huh???” post seemed to indicate — I’ll repost the quotes.
Willie Randolph
“Just because he gets on base doesn’t mean he’s doing the right thing.â€
Harold Reynlods
Sometimes getting on base isn’t enough. Sometimes even getting a hit isn’t enough. That’s what SITUATIONAL HITTING is all about.â€
Chambliss:
“One of the major things overall is to mold the group to produce runs as a team and not so much individuals – but as a group,†Chambliss said.
Philosophy as a hitting coach: “I don’t really have any revolutionary thing. What I will try do with this team is get real basic with the fundamentals. That’s a thing I stress. Hitting in situations. Moving runners over. Cutting down on strikeouts. Using the whole field … â€
No one is saying .OBP isn’t valuable, but adjusting your approach at the plate to the game situation (which at times will not show up in the box score or boost your .OBP/overall numbers) is usually more valuable to the team as a whole and managers, as well.
Situational hitting isn’t a bad thing, but it’s not as important as you seem to be suggesting. I’d rather have a guy with another .030 of On-base Percentage than a guy who is better at grounding out to second base and sac bunting.
Wow, fun thread to be coming in so late on – after the smell of sulfur has all but dissipated. But…
#30 – Guys who played the game well often are quite clueless in baseball analysis (see Morgan, Joe). The Reynolds quote is a great example. Not the part of the quote that BigKT is talking about, but this: “but when you’re down 3 runs with 2 outs in the 9th inning and a runner on 2nd, what good is a walk then?” Wow!
#40 – Thanks, Richard, I’ll be laughing for days thinking about that last sentence. And I’ll find need to employ it myself on a regular basis.
#41 – Sabermetrics simply argues that the SB, in the current MLB run-scoring environment, is overused. And it provides a nice analysis of exactly why Roberts’ postseason steal was a nearly perfect example of when you should try it. (Read Chaper 4-1 of Baseball Between the Numbers.)
#43 – Sabermetrics doesn’t devalue defense; it does acknowledge that at present defensive metrics are far less precise, or should I say have far less predictive value, than offensive or pitching-related metrics.
A guy who is a good hitter should ALMOST NEVER sac bunt. Therefore the ability to sac bunt is really only important if the guy isn’t a good hitter. A guy who is a good hitter shouldn’t come up looking to hit a grounder toward the right side. He should come up looking to get on base. Unless the guy hitting behind you can’t hit at all and you’re out of pinch hitters, taking a walk is ALMOST ALWAYS better than grounding out to second. Trust me, walks contribute to more runs than ground outs.
I mean, what’s better? Runners on first and second with no outs, or a runner on third with one out? I’d rather have a guy look to draw a walk than look to move the runner over with a runner on.
57: Shorter version: Fundamentals are nice, but slugging and plate discipline are more important and it ain’t close.
BigKT (#28), “They’d work the count, running up pitch totals for the opposition early in the game. The cumulative effect tired the starter. That often meant they’d get a chance to tee off on middle relievers, the weakest link in any pitching staff.”
That’s EXACTLY the philosophy I like. You don’t want to strike out. You want to talk your walks. And when you’re up to bat, you want to get on base, but if a guy is on second w/ less than 2 outs, you try to hit the ball towards right field (unless they’re over-playing you)…
Jeter has his critics in the SABR community basically b/c he’s guilty of being over-rated defensively. He is, however, one of the most complete players in baseball. He has power, he takes walks, he could strike out less, and he works within the context of the situation.
You never want to give away outs (see sac bunting w/ a good hitter and Richard’s comments @ 57) but you do want to leverage your possibilities; create a win-win situation where if you get a hit great, but if you fail to get the hit, your team still benefits.
59: Well stated, Peter.
I didn’t see Cameron’s bunt — the one that almost caused Coronado Mike to jump off his eponymous bridge — so maybe someone will have the heart (and time) to go back and examine the game situation and come up with reasons why Bochy might have had him bunt. A few questions we might want to think about:
Who was pitching? Who was left in the bullpen (Pads and opposition’s)? Who was on base and what was the score? How had Cameron fared in previous at-bats in the game and the previous three games? Had he been striking out every other at-bat or looked hapless at the plate? How was his batting practice session? Did the hitting coach or bench coach communicate something to Bochy that influenced his decision? Had Cameron faced the guy on the mound previously? Had the guy on deck had particular success against the guy on mound or the guy in the bullpen they were likely to bring in? (Yes, I know that means little to you, Richard, but managers seek out tiny advantages like that because they have played the game long enough to know that they do matter, even if the statistics indicate otherwise.) Who was playing third base? How deep was he? Was it a straight sacrifice, or with Cameron’s speed was there a good chance he could put pressure on the pitcher or third baseman to make a bad throw? Was there an element of “Ramon Hernandez” surprise involved — how often had Cameron been asked to sacrifice in similar situations in the past? And there are about 50 more questions I could come up that could possibly justify Bochy’s decision. Feel free to add to the list, but please don’t tell me it was wrong because it didn’t work. The Pads finished first place, but that doesn’t mean every move Bochy made was the best one, either.
I don’t think Bochy was purposely trying to lose the game. Possibly more inconceivable than Bochy’s decision was Cameron’s failure in that situation (if it was a straight sacrifice). Again, I don’t recall exactly what happened, but at the time the decision to have Cameron bunt didn’t strike me as a horrendous idea.
Maybe we can compare it to LT throwing a pass (or maybe not). As you ALMOST NEVER want a good hitter to sacrifice, you ALMOST NEVER want your RB to throw a pass, especially when you’ve got a quarterback who can do it much better. But it hasn’t worked out too poorly for the Chargers when they’ve tried it. Why is that?
Richard and Peter, Burrell had 94 RBI last year and hit .221 with RSIP. Any thoughts?
Re 61: I’m not Richard or Peter (at least I don’t think I am
, but RBI are a counting stat which are more dependent on lineup (how many quality offensive performers are on the team) and position in the batting order (a 4 or 5 hitter can be horrendous with runners on base and still accumulate a good number of RBI).
As for Burrell’s BA with RISP, BA is a rate stat which fluctuates year to year and is thought to be somewhat dependent on “luck.” Sometimes balls fall in during a season and the next year are outs, for whatever reason. I believe I have that is correct, but I may be mistaken.
Furthermore, when you’re looking at a single season of RISP, you’re looking at a fairly small sample size. So in addition to the .221 of last year, you have a .313 in 2005, a .263 in 2004, a .320 in 2003, a .295 in 2002, and a .257 in 2001. Career, a much better sample size, is .267.
The year to year fluctuation seen in Burrell in isolation is what is seen in larger populations when “clutch” hitting is studied. That is to say, there is generally no correspondence between who is clutch in one year and who is clutch the next year. Assuming, of course, that clutch is being defined as hitting with RISP.
To sum up with regards to Burrell, I’d say you have a guy with horrendous BA, but pretty darn good OBP skills and plus, but not great, power numbers. He’s not young, but he’s not old, and he’s played enough that what you see is what you’ll get for the next 3 to 5 years, assuming he doesn’t incur any serious injuries. You’ll get about 80 to 90 BB’s, about 150 K’s, about 30 2B and 30 HR. And in the years where the 1B fall in you’ll get a .280 BA, but in the years when they don’t you’ll get a .260.
Re 61
That was helpful and instructional, and after looking at Burrell’s situational stats over the past 5 years, very accurate. So the difference between his 05 and 06 BA w/RISP — the lowest of his career — was primarily due to small sample size and a fair amount of luck. Thanks.
From Gammons:
The Padres still believe that David Wells will end up pitching another year. If he pitches, Wells will win. He’s the 14th winningest left-hander of all time. The Padres have dabbled in the Ramirez talks but don’t think they have enough without trading Peavy, which is not going to happen. Boston does not think Scott Linebrink is a closer, and the one available starter in that kind of deal would be Clay Hensley. “That,” says one GM, “isn’t going to get it done.”
The Wells thing is interesting…I would love to have him back at a reasonable salary ($4M?) as a #4 or #5 guy. His recent fragility combined with his age make me hope no one in the front office sees him as a top of the rotation workhorse.
What, Linebrink + Hensley doesn’t net us Manny? I’m shocked, truly shocked. Maybe if we threw in a few bags of shag balls? Glad to see someone really close to the Boston front office (Gammons) refuting the Peavy to Boston rumors. He’s still got a lot of risk (injury risk I mean), but I want to see that story play out as a Padre.
BigKTFan…surprised you remember that…I still talk about that play as the one that broke the camel’s back. It is when I decided I was done making excuses for the Boch. I do appreciate the efforts of those at DS talking me down.
As far as Pat the Bat, I think he may be a good fit. His periferal numbers suggest that ’06 was a fluke and he is poised for a big year in ’07. They need a set-up/closer type of guy. They are fearful that Gordon will break down. I think the Pads may have that.
Give me Boomer for another year…I think he would command $7-8mm, but in today’s environment and the lower risk of a 1-yr deal, we should do that all day long.
One thing not mentioned earlier from the Gammons article:
“Bruce Bochy’s many friends back in San Diego kid him about having so many familiar faces in San Francisco: Dave Roberts and Mark Loretta (in addition to Rich Aurilia) plus the possibility of Ryan Klesko going back.”
Where would Loretta play now that Aurilla and Durham are on board? Plus, Feliz is pretty much back, too, right?
Reminds me of an oh-so-knowlegable segment on XX where Josh Rosenberg and Jack Kronin were talking about Manny and the Pads/Giants. They said that the Giants had developed the sort of young pitching that could possibly get the deal done, whereas the Pads’ cupboard was essentially bereft of chips. So if the Giants are so adept at developing young hurlers, who would pitch effectively in SF if they traded Cain and Linoceum to get Manny? Hennessey and Lowry? Maybe, but if the Giants’ system is better than the Pads’, why are they just signing more mid-30s types? Grow some knowledge, guys. I’d much rather have Chris Ello for lunch.
“(Yes, I know that means little to you, Richard, but managers seek out tiny advantages like that because they have played the game long enough to know that they do matter, even if the statistics indicate otherwise.)”
If by tiny, you mean non-existent.
“Maybe we can compare it to LT throwing a pass (or maybe not). As you ALMOST NEVER want a good hitter to sacrifice, you ALMOST NEVER want your RB to throw a pass, especially when you’ve got a quarterback who can do it much better. But it hasn’t worked out too poorly for the Chargers when they’ve tried it. Why is that?
Richard and Peter, Burrell had 94 RBI last year and hit .221 with RSIP. Any thoughts? ”
First of all, that’s a horrible analogy. It’d be more like having your great running back try to jump over the pile to pick up one yard on first and ten. You just can’t compare a trick play to a sac bunt. It’s more akin to swinging for the fences in a situation in which you’d normally be looking to go the other way. Tony Gwynn looking to pull the ball. Not Mike Cameron intentionally making an out.
RISP numbers are non-predictive of future performance.
RIchard,
What about all the clutch hitters that we need? Who are they?
70: There’s no way to identify a clutch hitter.